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Abstract
How do social networks evolve when both friendly and unfriendly relations exist?
Here we propose a simple dynamics for social networks in which the sense of a
relationship can change so as to eliminate imbalanced triads—relationship triangles
that contains 1 or 3 unfriendly links. In this dynamics, a friendly link changes to
unfriendly or vice versa in an imbalanced triad to make the triad balanced. Such
networks undergo a dynamic phase transition from a steady state to “utopia”—all
friendly links—as the amount of network friendliness is changed. Basic features of
the long-time dynamics and the phase transition are discussed.
Key words: Social balance, Networks
PACS: 02.50.Ey, 05.40.-a, 89.75.Fb
1 Introduction
As we all have experienced, social networks can evolve in convoluted ways.
Friendships can become estrangements and vice versa. New friendships can
be created while existing friends drift apart. How are these changing relations
reflected in the structure of social networks? As a familiar and illustrative
example, suppose that you are friendly with a married couple that gets di-
vorced. A dilemma arises if you try to remain friendly with both of the former
spouses. You may find yourself in the uncomfortable position of listening to
each of the former spouses separately disparaging each other. Ultimately you
may find it simplest to remain friends with only one of the former spouses
and to cut relations with the other ex-spouse. In the language of social bal-
ance [1,2,3,4], the initially balanced triad became unbalanced when the couple
divorced. When you subsequently kept your friendship with only one former
spouse, social balance is restored.
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Fig. 1. Evolution of a married couple plus friend triad. After a divorce the triad
becomes imbalanced, but balance is restored after another relationship change. Full
and dashed lines represent friendly and unfriendly relations respectively.
What happens in a larger social network? Now we need to look at all triads ijk
that link individuals i, j, and k. We define the link variable sij = 1 if i and j
friends and sij = −1 otherwise. Then the triad ijk is balanced if sijsjkski = 1,
and is imbalanced otherwise (Fig. 1). A balanced triad therefore fulfills the
adage:
• a friend of my friend as well as an enemy of my enemy is my friend;
• a friend of my enemy as well as an enemy of my friend is my enemy.
A network is balanced if each constituent triad is balanced [1,4]. A seemingly
more general definition of a balanced network is to require that each closed
cycle is balanced; that is,
∏
ℓ∈path sℓ = +1. Cartwright and Harary showed [5]
that a cycle-based definition of balance is equivalent to a triad-based definition
for complete graphs. This result can be reformulated as follows: if we detect
an imbalanced cycle of any length in a complete graph, there must be an
imbalanced triad.
Balance theory was originally introduced by Heider [1] and important con-
tributions were made by many others [2,3,6]. Cartwright and Harary [5,7]
translated Heider’s ideas into the framework of graph theory, and proved sev-
eral fundamental theorems about the structure of balanced networks. There
is also an extensive literature on balance theory (see e.g., [4,8,9,10,11,12,13]
and references therein).
Cartwright and Harary showed that on a complete graph balanced societies
are remarkably simple: either all individuals are mutual friends (“utopia”), or
the network segregates into two mutually antagonistic but internally friendly
cliques—a “bipolar” state [5]. However, spontaneously balanced states are
rare—if one were to assign relationships in a social network at random, the
probability that this society is balanced would vanish exponentially with sys-
tem size. Thus to understand how a network reaches a balanced state we need
to go beyond static descriptions to investigate how an initially imbalanced
society becomes balanced via social dynamics.
Here we discuss the evolution of such social networks when we allow the sense
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of each link to change from friendly to unfriendly or vice versa to reflect the
natural human tendency to reduce imbalanced triads [14,15]. Two such dynam-
ics are considered: local triad dynamics (LTD) and constrained triad dynamics
(CTD). For simplicity, we consider complete graph networks—everyone knows
everyone else. We will address the basic question: what is the long-time state
of such networks?
2 Local Triad Dynamics
2.1 The Update Rule
In local triad dynamics (LTD), an imbalanced triad is selected at random and
the sign of a relationship between two individuals is flipped to restore the triad
to balance. This change is made irregardless if other triads become imbalanced
as a result. Thus LTD can be viewed as the social graces of the clueless—such
a person makes a relationship change without considering the ramifications
on the rest of his social network. We define a triad △ to be of type k if it
contains k unfriendly links. Thus △0 and △2 are balanced, while △1 and △3
are imbalanced. With these definitions, the LTD rules are (Fig. 2):
1
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Fig. 2. An update step on imbalanced triads △1 (left) and △3 (right) by local triad
dynamics. Solid and dashed lines represent friendly and unfriendly links, respec-
tively.
(1) Pick a random imbalanced (frustrated) triad.
(2) If the triad is of type △1, then: (i) with probability p, change the un-
friendly link to a friendly link; (ii) with probability 1−p, change a friendly
link to an unfriendly link.
(3) If the triad is of type △3, then change an unfriendly link to a friendly
link.
After the update, the initial imbalanced target triad becomes balanced, but
other previously-balanced triads that share a link with this target may become
imbalanced. These triads can subsequently evolve and return to balance, lead-
ing to new imbalanced triads. For example, when a married couple breaks up,
friends of the former couple that remain friends with the former wife may
then redefine their relationships with those who choose to remain friends with
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the former husband. These redefinitions, may lead to additional relationship
shifts, etc.
2.2 Evolution on the Complete Graph
We now study LTD on a finite complete graph of N nodes, L =
(
N
2
)
links, and
N△ =
(
N
3
)
triads. Let Nk be the number of triads that contain k unfriendly
links, with nk = Nk/N△ the respective triad densities, and L
+ (L−) the num-
ber of friendly (unfriendly) links. The number of triads and links are related
by
L+=
3N0 + 2N1 +N2
N − 2 , L
−=
N1 + 2N2 + 3N3
N − 2 . (1)
The numerator counts the number of friendly links in all triads while the
denominator appears because each link is counted N − 2 times. The density
of friendly links is therefore ρ = L+/L = (3n0+2n1+n2)/3, while the density
of unfriendly links is 1− ρ = L−/L.
It is useful to introduce the quantities N+k as follows: for each friendly link,
count the number of triads of type △k that are attached to this link. Then
N+k is the average number of such triads over all friendly links. This number
is
N+k =
(3− k)Nk
L+
. (2)
The factor (3 − k)Nk accounts for the fact that each of the Nk triads of
type △k is attached to 3 − k friendly links; dividing by L+ then gives the
average number of such triads. Analogously, we introduce N−k = kNk/L
−.
Since the total number of triads attached to any given link equals N − 2, the
corresponding triad densities are (Fig. 3)
n+k =
N+k
N − 2 =
(3− k)nk
3n0 + 2n1 + n2
(3a)
n−k =
N−k
N − 2 =
knk
n1 + 2n2 + 3n3
. (3b)
We now write rate equations that account for the changes in the triad densities
in an update. We choose a triad at random; if it is imbalanced (△1 or △3) we
change one of its links as shown in Fig. 2. Let pi+ be the probability that a link
changes from friendly to unfriendly in an update event, and vice versa for pi−.
A friendly link changes to unfriendly with probability 1− p when △1 → △2,
while an unfriendly link changes to friendly with probability p if △1 → △0
and with probability 1 if △3 →△2. Consequently
pi+ = (1− p)n1 pi− = p n1 + n3. (4)
4
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Fig. 3. Illustration of the different types of triads (N − 2 in total) that are attached
to a positive link (heavy line). Also shown are the stationary-state probabilities
for each triad when the friendly link density is ρ. Full and dashed lines represent
friendly and unfriendly relations, respectively.
In the special case of p = 1/3, each link of an imbalanced triad is flipped
equiprobably. Since each update changes N −2 triads, and we define one time
step as L update events. Then the rate equations for the triad densities have
the size-independent form
n˙0 = pi
−n−1 − pi+n+0 ,
n˙1 = pi
+n+0 + pi
−n−2 − pi−n−1 − pi+n+1 ,
n˙2 = pi
+n+1 + pi
−n−3 − pi−n−2 − pi+n+2 ,
n˙3 = pi
+n+2 − pi−n−3 ,
(5)
where the overdot denotes the time derivative.
Let us determine the stationary solution to these equations. Setting the left-
hand sides of Eqs. (5) to zero and also imposing pi+ = pi− to ensure a fixed
friendship density, we obtain n+0 = n
−
1 , n
+
1 = n
−
2 , n
+
2 = n
−
3 . Forming
products such as n+0 n
−
2 = n
+
1 n
−
1 , these relations are equivalent to
3n0n2 = n
2
1 , 3n1n3 = n
2
2 . (6)
Furthermore, the stationarity condition, pi+ = pi−, gives n3 = (1 − 2p)n1.
Using these two results, as well as the normalization condition,
∑
nk = 1, in
Eqs. (6), we find, after straightforward algebra, that the stationary density of
friendly links is
ρ∞ =

1/[
√
3(1− 2p) + 1] p ≤ 1/2;
1 p ≥ 1/2. (7)
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The triad densities of each type become uncorrelated and are given by
nj =
(
3
j
)
ρ3−j∞ (1− ρ∞)j . (8)
As shown in Fig. 4, the stationary density of friendly links ρ∞ monotonically
increases with p for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1/2 until utopia is reached. Near the phase
transition, the density of unfriendly links u ≡ 1− ρ∞ vanishes as
√
3(1− 2p).
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Fig. 4. The stationary densities nk(p) and the density of friendly links ρ∞ as a
function of p. Simulation results for ρ∞ for N = 64 (crosses) and 256 (boxes) are
also shown.
2.3 The Evolving State
A remarkable feature of the master equations (5) is that if the initial triad
densities are given by Eq. (8)—uncorrelated densities—the densities will re-
main uncorrelated forever. In this case, it suffices to study the time evolution
of the density of friendly links ρ(t). We determine this time evolution directly
by noting that ρ(t) increases if △3 → △2 or △1 → △0, and decreases if
△1 → △2. Since the respective probabilities for these processes are 1, p, and
1− p, we have
dρ
dt
= 3(2p− 1)ρ2(1− ρ) + (1− ρ)3. (9)
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Solving this equation, the time dependence of the density of friendly links has
the following behaviors:
ρ(t)− ρ∞ ∼


Ae−Bt p < 1/2
− 1− ρ0√
1 + 2(1− ρ0)2t
p = 1/2
−Ce−3(2p−1)t p > 1/2 ,
(10)
where A, B, and C are constants. Thus for p 6= 1/2 there is quick approach to
a final state. This state is frustrated for p < 1/2 and is utopian for p > 1/2.
For p = 1/2 utopia is reached slowly—as a power-law in time.
2.4 Fate of a Finite Society
Abstractly, LTD represents a stochastic dynamics in a state space in which
each network configuration is represented by a point in this space and a link
to another point represents an allowed transition by the dynamics. Because
balanced networks represent absorbing states of this dynamics, a finite network
must ultimately fall into a balanced state for all p. We now estimate the size
dependence of the time to reach a balanced state, TN , for any value of p by
probabilistic arguments.
N N
balance
Fig. 5. Effective random walk picture for the approach to balance for p < 1/2.
For p < 1/2, we use the following random walk argument (Fig. 5): when a
link is flipped on an imbalanced triad on an almost balanced network (nearly
N3/6 balanced triads), then of the order of N triads that contain this link
will become imbalanced. Thus starting near balance, LTD is equivalent to a
biased random walk in the state space of all network configurations, with the
bias is directed away from balance, and with the bias velocity v proportional
to N . Conversely, far from the balanced state, local triad dynamics is diffu-
sive because the number of imbalanced triads changes by of the order of ±N
equiprobably in a single update. The corresponding diffusion coefficient D is
then proportional to N2. Since the total number of triads in a network of N
nodes is N△ ∼ N3/6, we therefore expect that the time TN to reach balance
will scale as TN ∼ evN△/D ∼ eN2 [16].
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Fig. 6. Illustration of the rate equation solution for the unfriendly link density versus
time on a double logarithmic scale and the influence of fluctuations on this solution.
For p > 1/2, we define the time to reach the balanced state by the naive
criterion u(t) ≡ 1 − ρ(t) = N−2; that is, one unfriendly link remains. From
Eq. (10), TN will then grow logarithmically with N . At p = 1/2, using Eq. (10),
the criterion u(t) = N−2 now gives TN ∼ N4. While simulations show that
TN scales algebraically with N , the exponent is much smaller than 4. The
source of this smaller exponent is the fact that the number of unfriendly links
fluctuates strongly about its mean value when there are few unfriendly links
(see Fig. 6). To determine these fluctuations we write the number of unfriendly
links in the canonical form [17]
U(t) = Lu(t) +
√
Lη(t), (11)
where u(t) is deterministic and η(t) is a stochastic variable. Both u and η
are size independent in the thermodynamic limit. A detailed argument [14]
shows that σ ≡ 〈η2〉 grows as σ ∼ √t as t → ∞. Because of the finite-size
fluctuations in U , the time to reach utopia TN is determined by the criterion
that fluctuations in U become of the same order as the average, viz.,
√
Lσ(TN ) ∼ Lu(TN) . (12)
Using u(t) ∼ 1/√t from Eq. (10), σ ∼ √t, and L ∼ N2, Eq. (12) becomes
N T
1/4
N ∼ N2 T−1/2N , from which TN follows.
Summarizing our results, we have:
TN ∝


eN
2
p < 1/2
N4/3 p = 1/2
(2p− 1)−1 lnN p > 1/2 .
(13)
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Fig. 7. Average time to reach balance as a function of N for an initially antagonistic
society (ρ0 = 0) for: (a) p = 1/3; (b) p = 1/2; (c) p=3/4. The line in (b) has slope
4/3.
These are in agreement with our simulation results shown in Fig. 7.
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3 Constrained Triad Dynamics
In constrained triad dynamics (CTD), we first select an imbalanced triad at
random and then select a random link in this triad. We change the sign of
the link only if the total number of imbalanced triads decreases. If the total
number of imbalanced triads is conserved in an update, then the update occurs
with probability 1/2. CTD can be viewed as the dynamics of a socially aware
individual who considers her entire social circle before making any relationship
change. Because of this global constraint, a network is quickly driven to a
balanced state in a time that scales as lnN .
A more interesting feature is the existence of a dynamical phase transition in
the structure of the final state as a function of the initial friendly link density
ρ0 (Fig. 8). We quantify this structural change by the scaled difference in
sizes of the two cliques in the final state, δ ≡ (C1 − C2)/N . For ρ0 < 0.4
the cliques in the final state are nearly the same size and 〈δ2〉 ≈ 0. As ρ0
increases toward ρ∗0 ≈ 2/3, the size difference continuously increases and a
sudden change occurs at ρ∗0, beyond which the final state is utopia. Since 〈δ2〉
and the density of friendly links ρ∞ are related by 〈δ2〉 = 2ρ∞ − 1 in a large
balanced society, uncorrelated initial relations generically lead to ρ∞ > ρ0.
Thus CTD tends to drive a network into a friendlier final state.
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Fig. 8. Asymmetry of the final state as a function of the initial friendship density
ρ0 for several network sizes.
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We now give a simple-minded argument that suggests that a large network
undergoes a sudden change from ρ∞ = 0 (two equal size cliques) to ρ∞ = 1
(utopia) as a function of the initial friendly link density ρ0. This qualitative
approach predicts that this transition occurs at ρ0 = 1/2. On the other hand,
our numerical simulations show that the transition is located near ρ∗0 ≈ 2/3
(Fig. 8).
Let us assume that a network remains uncorrelated during initial stages of
evolution and under this assumption we determine the probabilities for a spe-
cific friendly link to flip. If the network is uncorrelated, the densities n+ ≡
(n+0 , n
+
1 , n
+
2 , n
+
3 ) of triads that are attached to a friendly link are:
n+ = (ρ2, 2ρ(1− ρ), (1− ρ)2, 0). (14)
For a link to change from friendly to unfriendly, it is necessary that n+1 +n
+
3 >
n+0 +n
+
2 . That is, this link is a member of more imbalanced triads than balanced
triads. From Eq. (14), this condition is equivalent to 4ρ(1 − ρ) > 1, which
never holds. Consequently, friendly links never flip. Similarly, the densities
n− ≡ (n−0 , n−1 , n−2 , n−3 ) of triads attached to an unfriendly link are:
n− = (0, ρ2, 2ρ(1− ρ), (1− ρ)2). (15)
To flip this unfriendly bond, we must have n−1 + n
−
3 > n
−
0 + n
−
2 , i.e., the
bond is part of more imbalanced than balanced triads. This condition gives
1 > 4ρ(1 − ρ), which is valid when ρ 6= 1/2. Thus for a large uncorrelated
network, only unfriendly links flip in CTD, except for p = 1/2. Thus a network
with ρ0 > 1/2 should quickly evolve to utopia, while a network with ρ0 < 1/2
should quickly approach a state where ρ = 1/2.
Simulations indicate, however, that correlations in relationships occur when
ρ ≈ 1/2 and these ultimately lead to a bipolar society. We find that the
precursor to this bipolar society is a state in which the network partitions
itself by the dynamics into two subnetworks S1 and S2 of nearly equal sizes
C1 = |S1| and C2 = |S2|. Within each subnetwork, the density of friendly links
ρ1 and ρ2 slightly exceeds 1/2, while the density β of friendly links between
subnetworks is slightly less than 1/2. This small fluctuation is amplified by
CTD so that the final state is two nearly equal-size cliques.
To see how such evolution occurs, let us assume that relationships within
each subnetwork and between subnetworks are homogeneous. Consider first
the evolution within each clique. For an unfriendly link in S1, the densities
of triads attached to this link are given by (15), with ρ replaced by β when
the third vertex in the triad belongs to S2, and by (15), with ρ replaced by ρ1
when the third vertex belongs to S1. The requirement that a link can change
from unfriendly to friendly by CTD now becomes
C1[1− 4ρ1(1− ρ1)] + C2[1− 4β(1− β)] > 0, (16)
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which is always satisfied. Conversely, friendly links within each subnetwork
can never change. As a result, negative intraclique links disappear and there
is increased cohesiveness within cliques.
ρ2ρ1
β
SS1 2
Fig. 9. Nascent cliques S1 and S2 (blobs at the extremities), with friendly link
densities ρ1, ρ2 >∼ 12 . The density of friendly links between cliques is β <∼ 12 . Top:
imbalanced triads that lead to an unfriendly link (think dashed line) changing to
a friendly link within one clique. Bottom: imbalanced triads that lead to a friendly
link (thick solid line) changing to a unfriendly link between cliques.
Consider now relations between cliques. For a friendly link between the sub-
networks, the triad densities attached to this link are
n+j = (βρj, β(1− ρj) + ρj(1− β), (1− β)(1− ρj), 0)
when the third vertex belongs to Sj . Since
β(1− ρj) + ρj(1− β)− βρj − (1− β)(1− ρj) = (2ρj − 1)(1− 2β) ,
the change friendly → unfriendly is possible if
[C1(2ρ1 − 1) + C2(2ρ2 − 1)](1− 2β) > 0 . (17)
Thus if the situation arises where ρ1 > 1/2, ρ2 > 1/2, and β < 1/2, the net-
work subsequently evolves to increase the density of intra-subnetwork friendly
links and decrease the density of inter-subnetwork friendly links. This bias
drives the network to a final bipolar state.
Finally, note that when C1 ≈ C2 ≈ N/2, the number of ways,
(
N
C1
)
, to par-
tition the original network into the two nascent subnetworks S1 and S2, is
maximal. Consequently, the partition in which C1 = C2 has the highest likeli-
hood of providing the initial link density fluctuation that ultimately leads to
12
two nearly equal-size cliques, as observed in our simulations (Fig. 8). Although
our argument fails to account for the precise location of the transition, the be-
havior of 〈δ2〉 in the two limiting cases of ρ0 → 0 and ρ0 → 1 is described
correctly.
4 Summary and Discussion
We presented a simple setting for social dynamics in which both friendly and
unfriendly links exist in a network. These links evolve according to natural
rules that reflect a social desire to avoid imbalanced triads. For local triad
dynamics, a finite network falls into a socially-balanced state in a time that
depends sensitively on the propensity p for forming a friendly link in an up-
date event. For an infinite network, a balanced state is never reached when
p < 1/2 and the system remains stationary. The density of unfriendly links
gradually decreases and the network undergoes a dynamical phase transition
to an absorbing, utopia state for p ≥ 1/2.
For constrained triad dynamics, an arbitrary network is quickly driven to
a balanced state. This rapid evolution results from the condition that the
number of imbalanced triads cannot increase. There is also a phase transition
from bipolarity to utopia as a function of the initial density of friendly links
that arises because of small structural fluctuations that are then amplified by
the dynamics.
It is interesting to consider the possible role of balance theory in interna-
tional relations [18], with the evolution of the relations among the protago-
nists of World War I being a particularly compelling example (Fig. 10). A
history starts with the Three Emperors’ League (1872, and revived in 1881)
that aligned Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. The Triple Alliance was
formed in 1882 that joined Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy into a bloc
that continued until World War I. In 1890, a bipartite agreement between Ger-
many and Russia lapsed and this ultimately led to the creation of a French-
Russian alliance over the period 1891-94. Subsequently an Entente Cordiale
between France and Great Britain was consummated in 1904, and then a
British-Russian agreement in 1907, that then bound France, Great Britain,
and Russia into the Triple Entente. While our account of these Byzantine ma-
neuvers is incomplete (see Refs. [19] for more information), and Fig. 10 does
not show all relations and thus the extent of network imbalance during the
intermediate stages, the basic point is that these relationship changes gradu-
ally led to a reorganization of the relations between European nations into a
socially balanced state. Thus while social balance is a natural outcome, it is
not necessarily a good one!
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3 Emperor’s league 1872−81 Triple Alliance 1882 German−Russian Lapse 1890
French−Russian Alliance 1891−94 Entente Cordiale 1904 British−Russian Alliance 1907
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Fig. 10. Evolution of the major relationship changes between the protagonists of
World War I from 1872–1907. Here GB = Great Britain, AH = Austria-Hungary,
G = Germany, I = Italy, R = Russia, and F = France.
Latin
AmericaSinic
Orthodox Japanese
HinduAfrican
IslamicWestern
Fig. 11. Emerging conflicting relationships among major cultures as predicted by
Huntington in 1996. Thicker dashed lines represent stronger conflict. This figure is
a reproduction from the Wikipedia article on “Clash of Civilizations”, Ref. [20].
Another more immediate, and perhaps more alarming, application of social
balance is to current international relations. As popularized in Huntington’s
book [21], there appear to be developing civilizational divisions across which
increasing conflict is occurring (Fig. 11). According to Huntington, the division
among humankind, and the source of future conflict, will be predominantly
cultural rather than ideological and economic. This thesis has generated a
great deal of criticism, yet the core idea—namely, that division and conflict is
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a more likely outcome rather than the Westernized world’s hope for a utopia
because of global democratization—may prove correct at least in the foresee-
able future.
We close with some potentially interesting open theoretical questions. First, it
is natural consider more general interactions. One can easily imagine ternary
relationships of friendly +, unfriendly −, or indifferent 0. Another possibil-
ity is continuous-valued interaction strengths. What is the number of cliques
and number of communities as a function of network size and the density of
indifferent relationships? Another direction, already considered by Davis [10],
is a more Machiavellian society in which triads with three unfriendly rela-
tions are acceptable—that is “an enemy of my enemy may still be my enemy.”
This more relaxed definition for imbalanced triads may lead to interesting dy-
namical behavior that will be worthwhile to explore. Finally, what happens if
relations are not symmetric, that is, sij 6= sji? How does one define balance
or some other notion of social stability with asymmetric interactions?
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